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AN EDIFICE OF MISSHAPEN STONES:
INTERPRETING FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 404(A)
DavidCrump *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Michelson v. United States' must be one of the U.S. Supreme
Court's most astute decisions about evidence. The defendant in that case
asked the Court to prohibit customary kinds of prosecution responses to
character testimony.2 The evidence in question contained undeniable
prejudice, and perhaps an appearance of irrationality when viewed in
isolation, but a long tradition supported its admissibility.3 In Michelson,
the Court upheld the use of the evidence.4
At the same time, the Justices recognized the seeming inconsistency
in this area of the law:
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the
profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of
compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to
one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the
5 other.
But somehow, it has proved a workable even if clumsy system.
And, in a metaphor more felicitous than judicial opinions usually offer,
the Court called the character rules a "grotesque structure," but reasoned
that the law was so constructed that "[t]o pull one misshapen stone

* B.A., Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas School of Law; John B. Neibel
Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
2. Id. at 472-75; see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Guilt Assuming Hypotheticals: Basic Character
Evidence Rules, CRIM.JUST., Winter 2006, at 47, 47-48.
3. Daniel D. Blinka, Character,Liberalism, andthe Protean Culture of Evidence Law, 37 U.

SEATTLE L. REv. 87, 97-99, 136-38 (2013).
4. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 483-85. The Court said that it was deferring to "accumulated
judicial experience," instead of "abstract logic." Id.
at 487.
5. Id.
at 486.
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out... is more likely simply to upset its present balance between
adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice."6
In other words, the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rule(s)"),7
particularly the "character evidence rules," 8 are irrational, if taken
singly. But, the development of their structure was inevitable. It would
have been difficult for the courts to resist including any of the elements
that make up these rules. 9 Taken one by one, the pieces are
indeed "misshapen," but they fit together in a way that the law could not
have avoided.
Part II of this Article explains the rational motivations that brought
about these odd rules and their equally odd interrelationships.1 l Part II
also supports the claim that the development of the structure was
inevitable. 1 Part II then proceeds to identify current issues that concern
the interpretation of the Rules, and to consider how, in light of their
overall structure, each misshapen stone should be interpreted. 12 In
pursuit of this analysis, this Article examines the manner in which the
chain of rules gets set in motion, 13 which almost always starts with an
initiative undertaken by the criminal defendant.' 4 Part III of this Article
discusses that the defendant may offer exculpatory evidence in the form
of a witness's testimony about a "pertinent trait" of his character. 15 The
latitude that this window of opportunity provides to the defendant is not
always clear. 16 And, since the defendant's use of the window permits the
opposition (the Government) to counter the defendant's gambit with
potentially prejudicial evidence,' 7 there are sometimes questions about
6. Id.
7. FED. R. EvID.
8. Id.404-405.
9. See infra Part H.A (justifying the conclusion that the character evidence rules were
inevitable).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part B.A.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 27-42.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 31-4 1.
14. The Rules allow the prosecution to initiate character evidence in relatively narrow
instances. See FED. R. EVl. 404(a)(2)(C) (allowing the Government to show the peaceable
character of the alleged victim in response to the defense's claim that the victim was the first
aggressor); id.404(a)(3) (allowing either party to attack the character of any witness for veracity).
These rules, however, are outside the scope of this Article. In addition, the invocation by the
defendant of certain substantive defenses allows the prosecution to use character evidence, see
United States v. Franco, 484 F.3d 347, 351-52 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (involving entrapment), as does
a crime element that requires proof of character, see Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 739-41
(9th Cir. 1963) (involving violent reputation as a relevant trait to extortion).
15. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
16. See infra Part MI(discussing the meaning of "pertinent trait").
17. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B) (permitting the Government to "rebut" with witnesses
attesting to the bad character of the defendant); id.405(a) (enabling the Government to cross-
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whether the window has been opened, and if so, how widely. Each of
these questions is analyzed later in this Article. 18
Part IV of this Article deals with the prosecution's response.' 9 If the
defendant chooses to offer character testimony, the Rules allow the
prosecution to ask questions about "specific instances" of the
defendant's conduct that are in opposition to the vision offered by the
character witnesses.2 ° Issues then arise about the limits of this allowance,
which is a dispensation to inject matter that the prosecution otherwise
would be forbidden to raise. 2' The prosecution also may offer rebuttal
evidence by calling "bad" character witnesses, 22 a possibility that is also
the subject of Part IV of this Article.2 3 Part V expresses the Author's
conclusions, which include: an argument that the Supreme Court was
right; that interpretation of the character rules should be informed by
consideration of how the full structure fits together; and that fiddling
with the resulting edifice by pulling out a misshapen stone is more likely
to upset the present balance than to establish a rational edifice.2 4
II.

A.

THE INEVITABLE (BUT CONFUSING) RULES FOR
CHARACTER EVIDENCE

The Defendant's Decision to Offer CharacterEvidence

The development of the character evidence rules was inevitable, in
the sense that each sequential step in the point and counterpoint is
supported by appealing arguments. Imagine a defendant accused of a
serious crime. Unlike many defendants whose criminal record is lengthy,
this particular defendant has led an exemplary life. He has a virtual army
of people who would be pleased to testify about his charitable activities,
his pleasant disposition, and his avoidance of harmful conduct. But the
court rules, let us suppose, that this testimony is inadmissible. None of
these character witnesses can testify to the defendant's good
character. This holding would be consistent with the usual approach to

examine character witnesses with questions about "specific instances" of defendant's misconduct).
18. See infra Parts H-IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. FED. R. EviD. 405(a).
21. See id. 404; see also infra Part II.B-C (describing the usual exclusions of character
evidence offered to prove action in conformity).
22. FED. R. EviD. 404 & advisory committee's note; see also infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
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character evidence offered to prove propensity, which is that the
evidence is excludable.
But, the ruling seems unfair. The defendant would say, in response:
"This is important evidence! My life itself speaks loudly, and it says that
I could not have committed this dastardly act. It just isn't in my
character. You are denying me the right to defend myself." And in
close cases, the addition of character evidence can turn the tide in favor
of acquittal. 6
The complaint of this hypothetical defendant has had enough
resonance to get the law's attention. 27 As a consequence, it seems
inevitable-or at least highly probable-that the Rules will allow, or
will be adjusted to allow, character evidence of some kind. This
possibility raises a set of other issues. Will all of the possible character
testimony that the defendant might desire to inject, on every subject,
become admissible? Will the jury have to listen to evidence about the
defendant's attendance at Sunday school, behavior at work, and conduct
in walking away from fights? And, if the law permits these kinds of
evidence, will it also allow rebuttal evidence showing that the incidents
cited by the defendant's witnesses are not true, so that the trial gets taken
over by sideshows? The reception of unlimited character evidence would
turn a criminal trial into a diffuse series of mini-trials about issues
distant from the question of guilt or innocence.
The answers to these problems is found in Rule 404(a) 28 and Rule
405(b).29 Rule 404(a)(1) allows "evidence of the defendant's pertinent
trait. 30 In other words, the defendant is permitted to offer character
evidence, but it must be limited to coverage of a "pertinent trait," and it
25. See FED. R. EVtD. 404(b)(1) (prohibiting character evidence offered to prove action in
conformity); see also Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181-82 (1997) (explaining exclusion
of evidence and its rationale); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685-88 (1988) (explaining
both the exclusion and the admissibility of evidence offered for another purpose).
26. In general, the inference of innocence in one particular situation from character evidence
is unsound, according to psychological science. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Characterto
Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 29
(1986-1987). Nevertheless, a widely shared view of character evidence tends to produce belief in
the inference of innocence. Id. at 17-18. But "character witnesses generally play a very small role in
deciding the main issues at trial." Exparte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 621-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
27. See generally David Crump, How Should We Treat CharacterEvidence Offered to Prove
Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 279 (1987) (providing commentary on Professor David Leonard's
analysis of the use of character evidence); Leonard, supra note 26 (explaining both the "rational
truth-seeking" paradigm of evidence law, which sees admissibility of character evidence as relevant
to possible innocence, and the paradigm of "catharsis," which deals with "legitimizing" criminal
trials by providing a sense that justice has been served).
28. FED.R. Ev1D.404(a).
29. Id.405(b).
30. Id. 404(a)(1)(A).
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cannot include everything in the defendant's life story that might depict
him in a positive light. 3' Rule 405(a) provides that character evidence
can consist only of "testimony about the person's reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion. 32 The defendant's witnesses can
say what the defendant's reputation is with respect to the pertinent
trait, or the witnesses can give their own opinions of the defendant's
character with respect to that trait.33 The inquiry, thus, becomes focused
and one-dimensional.
These rules limit the length of time that character evidence
consumes, and they prevent it from creating a mass of mini-trials.34 In
other words, they balance the desire for fairness to the defendant against
a recognition that the evidence is of marginal value. The soft-focus
testimony of friends of the defendant, who were not present at the events
comprising the alleged crime, does not detract much from the hard
evidence that the prosecution has to offer as its proof. It is only in close
cases that character evidence is likely to help the defendant, and only if
the defendant's character is relatively free from known blemishes. In
cases that are not so close, character evidence serves only what Professor
David Leonard has aptly described as a "cathartic" function; a function,
that is, that gives both parties the satisfaction of being heard on a point
that is largely irrelevant.35 Since the appearance of fairness calls for this
kind of evidence to be admissible, the Rules admit it-but they define
the permitted testimony so that the defendant's friends can get on and off
the witness stand quickly.36 Ideally, they should be able to deliver their
direct evidence in one-sentence responses to three or four questions.37
31. Id.& advisory committee's note.
32. Id. 405(a).
33. Id. & advisory committee's note.
34. Id.
35. Leonard, supranote 26, at 39-41.
36. See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note; Leonard, supra note 26, at 41.
37. The set of questions and answers might fit a paradigm somewhat like the following:
Q: Do you know the reputation of Dan Defendant for being peaceable and nonviolent in
the community in which he resides and among those with whom he associates?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: And what is that reputation?
A: He has an excellent reputation for being peaceable and nonviolent.
Q: Do you also, yourself, have an opinion about his character for being peaceable and
nonviolent?
A: I do.
Q: And what is your opinion?
A: He certainly is peaceable and nonviolent.
Some of this questioning, such as the insertion of "among those with whom he associates," is
verbose, but the phrase is traditional. Also, the witness may embroider the testimony by adding,
"Yes, I see him nearly every day," or "Everyone knows that he has an unblemished record," and the
defense lawyer sometimes invites such details. Even so, the testimony is usually brief.
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The Rules leave the decision of whether to offer this kind of
testimony solely to the defendant.38 The pertinent trait must be offered
by the accused. 39 The Government cannot offer pertinent-trait evidence
unless and until the defendant has done so.4 Again, the issue is one of
fairness, or perceived fairness. The prosecution cannot initiate an attack
on the defendant with evidence as tangential as character testimony-it
must stick to evidence proving the crime at issue. 41 This principle has a
major consequence for the defendant's decision. As Subpart II.B
explains, the prosecution can counter an offer of character evidence in
ways that are harmful to the defendant.4 2 But, the defendant can
avoid unleashing this harm by the simple expedient of not calling
character witnesses.
B. The Prosecution's Cross-Examinationof the CharacterWitnesses:
How Can Their CredibilityBe Tested?
And so, when new lawyers first encounter the rules that govern
character evidence, they seem to resemble Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland.43 But the paradox of the Rules, to paraphrase the Supreme
Court, is just beginning. 44 The prosecution's cross-examination of the
character witnesses will take the new lawyer into the crazier realm that
Alice visited after Wonderland in Through the Looking Glass.4 5
Rule 405(a), as is indicated above, confines character evidence to
reputation or opinion. 46 Then, ho
however, the Rule goes on to say: "On
cross-examination of the character witness, the court may allow an
inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person's conduct. 'A7 What
this sentence means is that although the defendant is limited to asking a
soft and general question about reputation or opinion on a pertinent trait,
such as peacefulness and nonviolence, the Government can ask about
38. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (allowing a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of a
pertinent trait).
39. Id.
40. Id.(allowing the Government to offer character evidence only "to rebut" character
evidence offered by the defendant); id 405(a) (permitting inquiry about "specific instances" only on
cross-examination of the defendant's character witnesses).
41. See id. 401, 403 (indicating that evidence must be relevant and non-prejudicial to be
admissible); Leonard, supra note 26, at 18-19.
42. See infra Part I.B.
43. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (London, MacMillan & Co.
1865).
44. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-99 (1948) ("When the defendant elects to
initiate a character inquiry, another anomalous rule comes into play.").
45.

LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (London, Macmillan & Co. 1871).

46.
47.

FED. R. EvID. 405(a); see supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
FED. R. EvD. 405(a).
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specific instances involving violent acts of the defendant, including
murders, robberies, and assaults.4 8 And, the specific instances need not
be supported by convictions; they can be raised by arrests that resulted in
nothing but releases, or, for that matter, by simple reports without
arrests. 49 The prosecutor need not be able to prove the specific instances.
A good-faith basis for believing that they occurred is enough.50
Why should this kind of inquiry by the prosecution be allowed?
The answer lies in the possibility that the defendant's character
witnesses are misinformed, have bad judgment, or are simply testifying
falsely. Any witness can be mistaken or lying, and the Rules are set up to
allow both sides to expose this possibility. 1 Imagine that the defendant's
witnesses, in a trial concerning an accusation of violence, testify
solemnly that his reputation for peacefulness is "good," or even
"excellent." But, the prosecution is holding a report of the defendant's
criminal history--commonly referred to as a "rap sheet"-which shows
a series of arrests and convictions for violent crimes that is as long as the
defendant's arm, to adopt the well-worn phrase. It would be surprising if
the law did not allow the opposing side, the prosecution, to test the
credibility of the defendant's witnesses. A response indicating ignorance
of the defendant's record exposes the witness as lacking the knowledge
that a character witness should have, and answers showing that the
witness knows about the defendant's many prior assaults, but still
considers him peaceful, suggest that the witness has bad judgment. The
Rules usually do not limit the jury to false impressions, and so, the
"specific instances" kind of cross-examination fulfills the usual purpose
of cross-examination: that of testing the witness's credibility. 52
The usual form of the cross-examination consists of "have you
heard" or "did you know" questions. 53 Imagine that a character witness
48. See id.
405 & advisory committee's note; Michelson, 335 U.S. at 479.
49. FED. R. EviD. 405 advisory committee's note. In fact, it need not even involve criminal
conduct, so long as it is responsive to the "pertinent trait" raised by the defendant. See, e.g., United
States v. Bah, 574 F.3d 106, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the trial court's allowance of a
Government question about a noncriminal act of dishonesty during the cross-examination of
witnesses who testified to the defendant's character for truthfulness in a trial involving a business
crime).
50. United States v. West, 58 F.3d 133, 141 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brown, 503 F.
Supp. 2d 239, 245 (D.D.C. 2007).
51. See Brown, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
52. FED. R. EviD. 405 advisory committee's note; Brown, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
53. See, e.g., West, 58 F.3d at 141 ("Massey argues on appeal that the district court erred
when it ruled that the government could cross-examine the character witnesses... with 'have you
heard' questions ....). Theoretically, "have you heard" questions would most properly be used for
reputation witnesses, who testify from what they have heard, and "did you know" questions for
opinion character witnesses, who form opinions from what they know; but this distinction is too fine
to be an issue most of the time. Cf United States v. Damblu, 134 F.3d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1998).
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has just testified that the defendant's character is peaceful. The
prosecution seeks to test the knowledge (or the judgment) of the witness.
"Did you know that he was convicted last year of aggravated assault?"
"No, I did not know that." "Did you know that the year before that, he
was arrested for another assault?" "No." "And did you know that ten
years before that, he was convicted of manslaughter, for which he served
a stretch of time in the state prison?" "Well, yes, I knew about that, but
he told me he was innocent, and I believe he was railroaded; therefore,
that instance does not affect my opinion."
Notice that the prosecutor does not offer proof of the specific
instances. The prosecutor does not even assert that they are factually
true, or that they happened. Rule 405(a) does not allow this kind of
proof. 4 It permits only an "inquiry" into specific instances. 5 The theory
is that the prosecutor is cross-examining the witness to show that the
witness is unreliable, not to show that the specific instances actually
occurred. 56 A believable character witness would know about relevant
specific instances, and would be able to treat them rationally in forming
an opinion about the defendant's character. 57 This is the essential
purpose of cross-examination, and it is difficult to see how it could be
conducted as effectively as the hypothetical rap sheet demands, without
"have you heards" and "did you knows."
But more is going on during the specific-instances inquiry than this,
of course. In addition to testing the witness's credibility, the "have you
heards" simultaneously suggest to the jury that the defendant did,
indeed, commit these horrible acts. 58 A skillful prosecutor might enhance
this effect by holding the rap sheet before him in the view of the jury,
and by including dates of offenses and other details in the questions.
"Have you heard that on May 27, 2014, this defendant was convicted
right here in Capital City of the crime of aggravated assault, committed
on a victim named Ollie Holmes?" The suggestion of the offense bleeds
into the jury box.5 9 It is an instance of a phenomenon well known to the
54. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
55. Id.
56. Cf United States v. Russo, 110 F.3d 948, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that crossexamination is designed "to elicit how much, if anything, [the witness knows]"); United States v.
Nektalov, No. $203CR.828, 2004 WL 1637010, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004) (stating that the
inquiry is "to show that the character witness is not fully familiar with, or truthful about, the
defendant's reputation").
57. Cf sources cited supranote 56.
58. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 n.18 (1948) ("[Tihe jury is pretty
certain to infer that defendant had in fact been arrested .... "). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
stated: "[W]e approve the procedure as calculated in practice to hold the inquiry within decent
bounds." Id.
59. See id.; Russo, 110 F.3d at 952-53; Nektalov, 2004 WL 1637010, at *2.
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law of evidence, namely, the problem of information that is relevant for
more than one purpose. 60 The official, proper purpose of the inquiry is to
test the credibility of the character witnesses. The unofficial effect is the
suggestion that the defendant is actually a bad person. In fact, the
defendant may be entitled to an instruction under Rule 105,61 to caution
the jury to avoid this unofficial inference.62 But, the two uses of the
evidence are intertwined, and it is hard to see how one can be separated
completely from the other.
In summary, it was inevitable that the Rules would permit the
defendant to offer character evidence. But, the Rules that permit
character evidence give rise to the possibility of witnesses who testify in
a manner that leaves a false impression, and therefore, it was probably
also inevitable that the Rules would empower the prosecution to counter
the evidence by inquiry into ."relevant specific instances" of the
defendant's conduct. 63 The kind of cross-examination allowed by Rule

405(b) may seem a misshapen stone if viewed in isolation, but it
dovetails with Rule 404(a)'s allowance of character evidence.6 4 The only
reason the two rules seem fair is because the defendant has a ready
means of preventing the Government from using this form of crossexamination: do not call character witnesses in the first place. The
defendant is in the driver's seat. The Rules give the defendant, and only
the defendant, the power to decide to offer character witnesses, or
not to offer them.65 Thus, the defendant has the ability to prevent this
sequence of evidence, including the specific-instances inquiry, from
happening at all.
C. The Prosecution'sRebuttal with "Bad" CharacterWitnesses
The Government has another arrow in its quiver. Rule 404(a)-the
same Rule that permits the defendant to call pertinent-trait witnessesalso provides that the prosecution may call character witnesses to rebut
the defense's character witnesses.6 6 In other words, the prosecution can
wait until the defendant has finished presenting his evidence, and then it
can offer witnesses who will provide testimony contrary to the evidence

60. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 481 n.18.
61. FED. R. EvID. 105.
62. Id.; Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see State v.
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 127 (N.J. 1999) (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. See FED. R. EVID. 405 & advisory committee's note.
64. Id. 404(a)-(b).
65. Id. 404(a)(2)(A).
66. Id.
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given by the defendant's witnesses.67 The prosecution's witnesses will
say that the defendant's character or reputation is bad.
This evidence, like cross-examination on specific instances, is
potentially devastating. The prosecution may, for example, call three
police officers, who will testify in uniform about their acquaintance with
the defendant, perhaps by saying that "he is well known." With their
badges gleaming, the three officers will each opine that the defendant's
character is "terrible," or "bad," or something synonymous with these
words. All but the densest jurors will infer that the defendant has been
handled multiple times.
Again, this part of the Rules seems inevitable. Rule 404(a) allows
the defendant to call character witnesses.68 If the defendant does so, Rule
405(a) allows the prosecution, first, to cross-examine the character
witnesses with inquiry into relevant specific instances.69 Second, the
Rules usually allow a party to introduce evidence that contradicts
opposing evidence, 70 and so perhaps the prosecutor's calling of rebuttal
witnesses is in line with the rest of the adversary system. 71 All of the
misshapen stones fit together, and they form an edifice that would not
remain structurally sound if any stone were removed. This is so, at least,
if one remembers that the defendant can prevent the prosecution from
offering this harmful evidence 72
by the simple expedient of refraining
witnesses.
character
calling
from
Thus, the Rules create an edifice of various parts that fit together,
even if they seem misshapen when each is viewed in isolation. But when
interpretive issues arise, they usually feature only one strange principle:
a single misshapen stone. The key to sensible interpretation of the
character rules, however, is to keep in mind the function of each rule in
the overall structure whenever any of the related processes are at issue.
III.

WHAT IS A "PERTINENT TRAIT," AND How Is IT RAISED?

Rule 404(a)(2) limits admissible character evidence to "pertinent
traits., 73 The meaning of this phrase controls the permissibl6 scope of
proper defense testimony. Some of the cases are relatively easy to

67. See United States v. Clark, 26 F. App'x 422, 426-28 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining this
procedure).
68. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
69. Id.
405(a).
70. See, e.g., id.
608, 806.
71. See generally Michelson v.United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
72. See Clark, 26 F. App'x at 426-28.
73. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/2

10

Crump: An Edifice of Misshapen Stones: Interpreting Federal Rule of Evid

2015]

AN EDIFICEOF MISSHAPEN STONES

understand.74 For example, a defendant accused of an offense of
violence is unlikely to be within the Rules if he offers testimony about
his reputation for honesty and fair dealing, and instead should ask about
nonviolence. 5 And, similarly, a defendant charged with fraud is unlikely
to be acting properly if he offers testimony about his character for
peacefulness, but rather, he should ask about honesty and fair dealing.76
Introduction of testimony that is off the point invites the defendant to
follow the non-pertinent question with a pertinent one-e.g., the assault
defendant asks first about honesty and fair dealing, and then, after
obtaining an answer asserting that his character on that trait is "good,"
he asks whether he has good character for peacefulness and nonviolence,
and obtains a favorable answer to that question, too. The first response,
on the non-pertinent trait, has the potential for confusing the issue, and it
lengthens the inquiry in violation of the policy of the rules, which favors
the briefest kind of testimony.77 For example, in United States v.
Jackson,78 the court concluded: "Since evidence of the trait of
truthfulness is not pertinent to the criminal charges of conspiracy to
distribute heroin or possession of heroin, Rule 404 forbids its
introduction as circumstantial evidence of innocence of those crimes. '
But, some kinds of offenses do not lend themselves easily to
identification of single pertinent traits. An example is distribution of
contraband, such as drugs. "Sobriety" is a trait responsive to offenses
involving intoxication or possession for personal use, but this dimension
of character may not seem relevant to the commercial activity involved
in dealing drugs.8 ° While "honesty" could be a pertinent trait on the
theory that an honest person does not deal in illegal drugs, some courts
have interpreted Rule 404(a) to exclude this kind of inquiry.8 The
exclusion of evidence about honesty in response to a drug conspiracy
indictment seems to be an excessively narrow interpretation of the
74. See Russ v. State, 934 So. 2d 527, 531-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
nonviolence is not a pertinent trait where the crime charged was molestation of a minor); State v.
Martinez, 679 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Iowa 2004) (holding that traits of "honesty, trustworthiness, and
dependability-are [not sufficiently] pertinent to crimes of delivery of methamphetamine").
75. Martinez, 679 N.W.2d at 625.
76. Cf Russ, 934 So. 2d at 531-32.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note (discussing the methods of proving
character by specific evidence). The committee note states: "[I]t possesses the greatest capacity to
arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time." Id.
78. 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. Id.at 1055.
80. See, e.g., Pennington v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1281, 1282, 1285 (5th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that
sobriety was pertinent to a theft charge, where intoxication was allegedly involved, and could be
dispelled by this trait).
81. Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1055; Russ, 934 So. 2d at 531-32; Martinez, 679 N.W.2d at 625.
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pertinent trait limitation. If that were a correct view of the rules, it would
be unfair to the defendant.
Even aside from the pertinent trait Rule, the courts seem
particularly reluctant to permit character witnesses to testify that a
defendant is honest or truthful.82 The reason probably lies in principles
that prevent the bolstering, by one side, of its own witnesses' credibility,
unless that credibility is attacked by the other side first.83 An opponent
can impeach any witness by offering a rebuttal witness to say that the
first witness has a bad reputation (or bad character) for truth, but it is
then, and only then, that the party impeached may defend its witness by
rebuttal character witnesses, who will say that the first witness is,
instead, truthful.84 The formal rationale for excluding a witness who
merely bolsters credibility is that all witnesses are presumed truthful
until attacked. 5 This is an excessive formality, however; the real reason
86
is reluctance to extend the trial with marginal character issues.
The trouble arises when there is no obvious pertinent trait that
contradicts the crime, other than honesty. In a case involving fraud, for
example, the defendant reasonably can claim that the pertinent traits are
"honesty and fair dealing," as the traditional way of asking the question
would go. In United States v. Bah,87 the court permitted the defendant to
counter a fraud accusation with character witnesses who testified in
terms of "truthfulness. 88 This result seems sensible. In fact, in a drug
case like Jackson,89 it is not easy to say what the pertinent trait
indicating innocence would be. It is possible to ask the question by
literally invoking the crime that is charged: "Do you know his reputation
or character for avoiding participation in drug conspiracies?" But, that is
an awkward way to phrase'a question in a trial, where we hope to
communicate to jurors in straightforward language. It seems, contrary to
Jackson, and as is implied by Bah, that the defendant should be able to
ask about the defendant's reputation for honesty in this situation, on the
theory that honest people do not engage in drug conspiracies. 90
82. See sources cited supra note 78.
83. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
84. Id. 608 advisory committee's note; United States v. Pruitt, 43 M.J. 864, 868-69 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 1996).
85. See H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character,and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through
the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 781 (1993).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
87. 574 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2009).
88. Id. at 117-18. Other courts have approved questions about "lawfulness" or "lawabidingness." United States v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380, 382 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Hewitt,
634 F.2d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1981).
89. United States v. Jackson, 588 F.3d 1046, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1979).
90. Bah, 574 F.3d at 118;Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1055.
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But there is another problem. Defense counsel may challenge the
limits of the rules by asking what are really character questions, but by
asking in informal ways that do not directly refer to any pertinent traits.
This strategy particularly seems to work with witnesses who are also
knowledgeable about something related to the alleged crime. If the
defendant's employer (or his father, or his minister) is an alibi witness,
for example, the defense may first establish the alibi, and then ask the
seemingly innocent question: "Was, or is, he a good employee (or son,
or parishioner)?" 91 This really is a character question that is not about a
specific trait, and if it is analyzed this way, it is not admissible. 92 But it
may be impractical for the Government to exclude it. The question is so
brief that it provides little time to act even for the quickest lawyer, and
the answer is one word--'Yes"-and it can be uttered before the
objection can be stated. In addition, a prosecutor often sees objecting as
tactically unwise, because the evidence threatens little harm to the
evidence of guilt, and because overly-frequent objections communicate a
bad impression to the jury. Besides, there is the question of whether this
really is character evidence or something else; maybe it is relevant to the
alibi in some unusual cases, because a good employee, or son, or
parishioner would be present at work, at home, or at religious services.9 3
Permitting brief questions of this kind seems consistent with the
basis for admitting character evidence,94 and it also conforms to the
policy of keeping the inquiry short. 95 The testimony probably should be
cut off if it begins to recount multiple acts by which the defendant has
shown himself to be a good employee. And, if it really injects character
evidence rather than speaking to a substantive issue, it ought to trigger
permission for the prosecution to use "have you heards" and badcharacter evidence.9 6
In summary, the phrase "pertinent trait" should be interpreted
liberally. First, a liberal interpretation would facilitate the offer of
character evidence in those cases in which the policy of the rules is to
allow it, especially in those cases in which pertinent traits are difficult to
91. E.g., People v. Woodard, No. 247182, 2004 WL 2827668, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 9,
2004) (holding that when the defendant "intentionally elicited opinion testimony ...regarding his
character as a good employee" in a prosecution for sexual assault, the prosecution properly crossexamined with specific instance inquiry).
92. Id.
93. See State v. Maske, 591 S.E.2d 521, 527 (N.C. 2004) (holding that evidence to the effect
that the crime victim "was a conscientious employee who would call if she was going to be late"
was not impermissible character evidence but was "relevant to establish the time of the offense").
94. See FED. R. EVID.404 advisory committee's note.
95. See supratext accompanying note 77.
96. See generally Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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specify. 97 Second, the testimony does not need to be lengthy, even if
pertinent traits are defined broadly. It can be limited to a brief question
and brief answer, and the trial judge should make sure that it is. Third,
this evidence does not inject an inference that is harmful enough to
justify fights about admissibility. In fact, it may be that the further the
inquiry distances itself from the most pertinent traits, the less it interferes
with the prosecution's legitimate interests. The courts should prevent the
defendant, however, from rephrasing and repeating character testimony
on differing traits and from converting the inquiry into a contest about
specific instances.
Fourth, and finally, the misshapen stone that the pertinent trait
limitation represents lies close to other misshapen stones. The defendant
should not be able to inject what is really character evidence, but
disguise it so that it appears to be something else, and thus, exempt it
from testing by cross-examination and rebuttal. If the inquiry really is
about character, as it often will be when it takes the form of a question to
an employer about whether the defendant "was a good.., employee," it
should be treated as a question that asks about character. 98 That is to say,
it should cause the court to look to the neighboring misshapen stone,
which is misshapen only because it is designed to fit the pertinent-trait
stone. The question should enable the prosecution to ask questions of the
"have you heard" type about specific instances, if it really is a character
question. This is an additional reason for broadly interpreting the
defendant's license to offer character testimony: the prosecution will
have the means to respond to a false impression conveyed to the jury. 99
This point, in turn, requires exploration of the limits of the prosecution's
ability to cross-examine.
IV.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF CHARACTER WITNESSES: How WIDE

IS THE PROSECUTION'S LATITUDE?

If the defendant initiates the use of character evidence, the
prosecution can test the knowledge and ability of the character witnesses
with questions about specific instances.' 00 The prosecutor crossexamines the witnesses by asking them questions such as: "Have you
heard that he was convicted of assault last year?" or "Did you know that
he committed a murder the year before?"'' 1 Therefore, the questions
97. See supratext accompanying notes 84-89.
98. See People v. Woodard, No. 247182, 2004 WL 2827668, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 9,
2004).
99.

See FED. R. EVID. 405(a).

100. Id.404-405.
101. See id.
405 (allowing inquiry with specific instances).
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arise: How broad is the prosecution's latitude?; Can the Government's
attorney bring up events twenty years old?; From another jurisdiction?;
Concerning wrongdoing of a different kind than the offense on trial?
Some cases from an earlier era, such as Awkard v. United States,0 2
confine the prosecution's cross-examination relatively narrowly. 10 3 In
Awkard, the court held that the Government should not have been able to
ask about events that occurred in another part of the defendant's life
several years after the character witnesses had known the defendant, and
in another jurisdiction. 1 4 The theory of exclusion was that the
defendant's witnesses could not have been expected to know of these
specific instances. 0 5 In addition, the court labeled the character evidence
"weak," pointed out that the prosecution had impeached the character
evidence by its time-remoteness, and argued that it could have been
stricken as inadmissible. 10 6 The decision also seems to imply that the
later instances, even though they were closer to the date of the crime on
trial, did not pertain to the defendant's relevant character because of the
time and location difference between the instances and the character
witnesses. 0 7 The court continued by stating:
This jurisdiction ... has endorsed the general rule that the prosecutor
can... inquire on cross-examination whether a defendant's character
witness "has heard" of defendant's prior arrests or
convictions .... Nonetheless, the risks of undue prejudice to the
108
defendant are great ....

Strangely, the court's grudging acknowledgment of the
prosecution's usual ability to cross-examine, and its exclusion of the
"have you heards," did not mention the defendant's initiation of
character evidence in the first place.' 0 9 Nor did it point out that the
character testimony was misleading, since events closer to the crime on
trial showed that the defendant's reputation was much worse than the
character evidence indicated." 0

102.
103.
104.
105.

352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 642-43; see United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Awkard, 352 F.2d at 644-46.
Id. at644-45.

106. Id. at 644.
107. See id. at 644-45.
108. Id. at 642-43 (footnotes omitted).

109. Id. at 644-46.
110.

Id. at 644-45.
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These exclusionary decisions"' seem misconceived. Character
evidence is usually weak evidence, and that fact should not prevent the
prosecution from pointing out its weakness. The idea that the evidence
could have been stricken did not remove the fact that the jury had heard
it, and it did not negate the defense attorney's having chosen to initiate
the use of this (weak) evidence, knowing the likelihood that specific-act
evidence would become admissible. But, most importantly, if the
character witnesses whom the defendant has chosen to call are not wellinformed about his character, the jury should be informed on crossexamination. In fact, it should be expected that character witnesses from
the defendant's place of employment, family, or house of worship do not
follow the defendant to places where he demonstrates bad character, and
therefore, they will frequently not know of whatever wrongdoing he may
have committed.
The character witness who does not know about the defendant's
recent trespasses because he lives in a remote place, where the defendant
lived once before, does not differ from other unaware character
witnesses. He merely claims a peculiar reason for his ignorance. The
same is true of the witness whom the defendant met only this year, who
has not heard of his activities five years ago. The witness's poor
credentials for giving his testimony is exactly the point, and the
Government should be able to expose the weakness of the evidence.
Worse yet, cases like Awkard invite the defendant to mislead the jury
and to insulate the falsehood from testing by cross-examination. 112 All
that is necessary is for the defense lawyer to call character witnesses
who knew the defendant at a time in his life before he committed his
transgressions. The Awkard holding means that a serial murderer can
offer glowing character testimony, and keep it unblemished from crossexamination by using only witnesses whose knowledge of the defendant
is confined to the period of time before he started his crime spree.113
The idea that the wrongdoing is no longer relevant to the
defendant's character because it is remote in time is arguably a better
reason for a court's intervention, but it still is not a persuasive basis for
the narrow approach exemplified by Awkard.114 First, reputation is a
long-range phenomenon. As William Shakespeare put it: "The evil that
Ill. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that inquiry
into acts committed after the crime on trial is improper); Exparte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 620-21
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (suggesting that the remoteness of time probably would have led to the
exclusion of the inquiry).
112. See, e.g., Awkard, 352 F.2d at 644-45.
113. Id.
114.

Id.
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men do lives after them, [t]he good is oft interred with their
bones .... ,,t 5 The reputation of a murderer, for example, remains after
he has served the sentence. Second, science knows little about predicting
future violations of the law. We do not know how to tell when time
remoteness of wrongdoing means that it is a poor indication of
character. 1 6 Third, the appeal of the argument that time remoteness is
irrelevant is well within the competence of the jury to evaluate. Jurors
can be informed, on redirect, that the allegations of evil acts that the
Government has suggested arose many years ago, and that the defendant
has not repeated them since. A skillful defense lawyer, in fact, can make
a remote allegation seem like a good-conduct medal, if the specific
incident really is of little weight. 1 7 Fourthly, Rule 405(b) contains no
time limitation on specific-instances inquiries.' 18 The relevant exclusiononly principle would be Rule 403,"9 and it excludes the evidence only if
the probative value is "substantially outweighed" by prejudice. 2 ° But
the Awkard case never discusses Rule 403, and it neglects to analyze the
prejudice created by misleading character evidence.' 2' Fifth, and finally,
the defendant can be certain of excluding all inquiries into his specific
misconduct by the simplest possible technique: by not calling character
witnesses in the first place.
115. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2.
116. See Leonard, supra note 26, at 25-29 (discussing psychological studies in relation to
character evidence).
117. The defensive gambit in this situation may take a form somewhat like the following:
Q: The prosecutor asked you whether you knew that the defendant had been convicted of
theft ten years ago. Did you know that?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you know that he pleaded guilty, honestly, unlike in this case, because he
was guilty ten years ago?
A: Yes. I knew that.
Q: And did you know that he received probation, because it was not an aggravated case?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you know that he was ordered to follow a long list of conditions of
probation, and his supervision made his life like walking on eggshells, because he could
be sent to jail for a violation without any right to ajury trial?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you know that he served out five years of probation honorably?
A: Yes.
Q: And he has never been convicted or even suspected, since?
A: Yes.
Q: And is that why you say that his character is excellent?
A: Yes. He's been tested, and it's excellent.
118. FED. R. EviD. 405(b).
119. Id. 403.
120. Id. (emphasis added); see Rosanna Cavallaro, FederalRules of Evidence 413-415 and the
Strugglefor Rulemaking Preeminence,98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 57 (2007).
121. Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641,644-46 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Most cases today are different from the narrow-minded reasoning
in Awkard. 122 They tend to allow the prosecution a great deal of room in
cross-examining character witnesses. For example, in Bah, the court
began by pointing out that the defendant can "choose" whether to offer
character evidence, and that if he does, "the government may question
the defendant's witnesses regarding 'relevant specific instances of
conduct."", 123 In doing so, said the court, the Government's attorneys
have "substantial latitude" for cross-examination. 124 The defendant
argued that the prosecutor should not be allowed to ask about any event
unless it is "likely to have become a matter of general knowledge,
currency or reputation in the community.' ' 25 The court rejected this
argument under the circumstances, pointing out that the event in
126
question was not secret and was the subject of an effort to publicize it.
Some courts have imposed the limit that Bah advocated, by
restricting specific-act questions to events of general knowledge, or at
least those that are public. 2 7 For example, in United States v.
Monteleone,128 the specific act in question concerned the defendant's
alleged perjury before a grand jury. 129 "Because grand jury proceedings
are required by law to be kept secret, ' 130 the Monteleone court decided
that the government lacked a good faith basis for believing that the
defendant's alleged perjury was likely to have been known in the
witness's community. 131 But even this limitation is not universally
shared. In Bah, the court pointedly observed that Monteleone was
decided in another circuit, and therefore, it was not binding authority.' 32
Furthermore, it distinguished that decision on grounds that would make
it inapplicable in most cases:
Monteleone, of course, is not binding in our circuit, but even if it
were, this case is distinguishable for three reasons. First, the evidence
presented on cross-examination did not derive from a secret
proceeding; to the contrary, the [person who objected to it] expressed a
122. A recent exception can be found in Exparte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 620-21 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). The Miller opinion differs from the Awkard opinion, however, in citing Rule 403,
although it did not conduct a Rule 403 balancing analysis. Id.
123. United States v. Bah, 574 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 405(a)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948); United States v. Monteleone,
77 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 1996).
128. 77 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1996).
129. Id.at 1088-89.
130. Bah, 574 F.3d at 118.
131. Id.; Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1090.
132. Bah, 574 F.3d at 118.
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desire that Bah's actions be widely publicized .... Second, the

challenged evidence did not involve criminal conduct, but dishonesty
in Bah's business dealings-information closely related to the subject
of [the character witness's] direct testimony, and far less inflammatory
(and potentially prejudicial) than the evidence at issue in Monteleone.
Third, we have previously observed that the Eighth Circuit has limited
Monteleone to cases involving reputation evidence and that it
has been more permissive in admitting evidence to impeach opinion
testimony. In this case, [the witness] testified as to his personal
opinion of Bah [as well as
133 Bah's reputation]. For these reasons,
Monteleone is unpersuasive.
The court nevertheless vacated the conviction on other134 grounds, thus
having addressed the character evidence issue for retrial.
The wide latitude afforded for cross-examination by modem cases
like Bah is appropriate. It was inevitable that, if the defendant chose to
present character evidence, the law would afford the prosecution the
ability to test that evidence by asking questions of the character
witnesses. Taken in isolation, the latitude to ask these kinds of questions
seems strange. It is like a misshapen stone. But, that is true only if one
ignores the first misshapen stone: the character evidence offered in the
first place by the defendant, which ought to be examined for misleading
tendencies. Courts that have taken a narrow view of this kind of crossexamination, like the court in Awkard, tend to ignore the misleading
impression that is left if the character evidence is not challenged by
"have you heards."' 135 They also tend to ignore the fact that the only way
this kind of evidence can become admissible is for the defendant to have
initiated character evidence.
V.

THE PROSECUTION'S REBUTTAL: "BAD" CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Fewer questions arise about the prosecution's offer of rebuttal
character evidence. Rule 404(a)(2)(A) provides that if the defendant
offers character evidence, the Government may respond with evidence
"to rebut it."' 136 In other words, if the defendant has chosen to raise 1the
37
character question, says the Rule, rebuttal evidence is also admissible.
This approach is consistent with the philosophy of the Rules, which is to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 118-19.
Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
FED. R. EvtD. 404(a)(2)(A).
Id.
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allow each side to
inform the jury about its view of the
138
evidence.
opponent's
The most significant issue that arises in connection with rebuttal
evidence concerns what might be called "camouflaged" character
evidence. Sometimes, defensive character testimony appears in
phraseology different from the usual wording.13 9 Sometimes, the
evidence comes from witnesses whose ostensible function is to provide
testimony about more direct issues in the case.1 40 One can readily
imagine a defense attorney who perceives that the witness is friendly,
and who adds a softball question about how good a son, employee, or
citizen the defendant is, but without using easily recognized character
terminology. Or, one can envision a witness who is a family member or
employer telling the jury about an alibi: the defendant was at home
watching television, or was at work, at the time of the offense, and adds
that "he is a good person." Or, one can imagine someone who saw the
alleged assault and testifies to self-defense, but who also is asked: "Is he
the kind of person who tries to start fights, or does he keep away from
them?" These kinds of questions can be phrased so that they really call
for character evidence, but they enable the defendant to argue that the
prosecutor should not be able to cross-examine the witnesses as
character witnesses, or to offer bad-character evidence in rebuttal.
The judge's ruling in this situation is heavily contextual. It depends
upon deciding whether the evidence is truly relevant to the substantive
issue of alibi or self-defense, or whether, instead, it really is disguised
character evidence that has little to do with those issues. This is a factbound determination. 14 A question such as, "Is he consistent about
138. See id.
404 advisory committee's note.
139. This issue can arise in an infinite variety of ways. For example, in People v. Woodard, the
testimony alluded that the defendant was a "good employee." No. 247182, 2004 WL 2827668, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2004). Although this was not usual character evidence terminology, the
court held that the defendant had injected character evidence and that the prosecution could make
specific-instance inquiries. Id.In United States v. Diaz, the trial court sustained an objection to a
question asked of the defendant's pastor about the defendant's "character traits for being prone to
criminal activity or conduct." 961 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992). The court of appeals held that
this question raised proper character testimony. Id. The trial court also sustained an objection to a
question about the defendant's "character trait for being prone to large-scale drug dealing;" the
court of appeals, however, held that this question did not raise the general character issue. Id. at
1419-20.
140. In United States v. Jenkins, the defendant's offer of evidence denying that he had ever
sold drugs was held not to raise character evidence sufficiently to allow rebuttal. 7 F.3d 803, 805-07
(8th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Vega-Penarete, No. 91-5902, 1992 WL 212142, at *3-5
(4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992) (holding that the defendant's self-portrayal as helpless and passive
throughout a series of encounters did not raise character evidence).
141. For an example of evidence that bordered on character evidence, but was, instead,
relevant to a substantive issue, see State v. Elmer, 21 F.3d 331, 335 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
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being present during working hours?" or "Does he watch that particular
television program every week?" is one thing-it sounds more like an
inquiry into evidence relevant to an alibi than a character question. On
the other hand, "Is he a good employee?" presents a closer question;
depending on the precise context, it sometimes should allow the
prosecutor to use "have you heards" and rebuttal character witnesses,
particularly since it is likely to bear only the most tangential relationship
to the alleged alibi. And, an invitation to the witness to deny that the
defendant would commit this kind of crime seems even more like
character evidence. "Would you even keep him as an employee, if you
thought he was capable of committing the crime of robbery?" for
example, would be camouflaged character evidence, and it should
prompt the judge to permit the Government to cross-examine
accordingly, and to offer rebuttal character witnesses.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court has said, character evidence under Rule
404(a) and Rule 405 is like an edifice of misshapen stones. 142 But, as the
Court also has recognized, the stones fit together, and the system created
by these oddly shaped principles has proved workable, even if clumsy. 143
An attempt to rationalize any single piece of the structure is likely to
create unfairness instead. As the Court said: "To pull one misshapen
stone out ...is more likely simply to upset its present balance . . . than
to establish a rational edifice."' 44
And so, the character evidence rules are confusing and
counterintuitive. But, perhaps, their development in their present form
was inevitable. The first step, allowing a defendant with an exemplary
life to present evidence of his good character, seems a simple matter of
fairness to the defendant. It makes sense to allow the defendant the
option of initiating this evidence or choosing not to, and its shortness of
life dictates that it be limited to reputation or opinion about a pertinent

various uses of character evidence under Rules 404 and 405). The defendant, a border patrol agent
prosecuted for assault-because of his act of shooting at illegal immigrants-asserted immunity
under federal statutes allegedly authorizing his actions. 1d.at 333-35. This immunity depended upon
his "honest and reasonable belief' that his actions were "necessary in the performance of his
dut[ies]." Id.at 335. The State of Arizona argued that Elmer's raising of a defense depending on
honesty had "placed his character for honesty in issue," allowing for specific instances in crossexamination and rebuttal bad-character evidence. Id. The testimony at issue, said the court, was,
instead, direct evidence of a substantive element of the defense, and not character evidence. Id.
142. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
143. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
144. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 486.
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trait, so that the trial does not disintegrate into a mass of mini-issues. 145
But, if the first step of allowing the defendant to use this kind of
evidence is undertaken, the next steps-cross-examination and rebuttal
146
by the Government-seem equally necessary as a matter of fairness.
A character witness who blesses the defendant may be misinformed,
affected by poor judgment, or merely lying, and it is easy to see that the
Rules should, therefore, enable the Government to confront the witness
with evidence showing the unreliability of the favorable testimony the
witness has given. And because the Rules usually permit a party to rebut
opposing evidence, it follows that the Government should be allowed to
47
call bad-character witnesses if the defendant chooses to raise the issue. 1
The Rules create a number of interpretive issues, and those issues
should be addressed with the whole structure in mind. Some cases have
confined the "pertinent trait" to which the defendant is limited too
narrowly by, for example, prohibiting defendants from offering
testimony about honesty in drug conspiracy cases. 148 These decisions
seem inappropriate for two reasons. First, some kinds of crimes,
including drug conspiracy offenses, do not bring to mind a clear contrary
trait that can be expressed in short and understandable language. Perhaps
honesty is as close as one can come, on the theory that honest people do
not participate in drug conspiracies. Courts also have approved questions
phrased in terms of "lawfulness" and "law-abidingness."' 149 Second, a
liberal interpretation of the phrase "pertinent trait" seems appropriate
given the reason for the Rule-fairness to the defendant-and it
is consistent with the policy that50 confines the evidence to a brief
statement of opinion or reputation. 1
If the defendant exercises the option to offer character evidence, the
Rules allow the Government to challenge the testimony, 151 and this
allowance, too, should be interpreted according to its purpose. Decisions
that prohibit the Government from offering "have you heard" questions,
after character evidence is undeniably in the record, are misconceived.
Sometimes, these decisions reason that the particular wrongdoing
targeted by these questions is unlikely to have been known to the
particular witnesses presented, but this justification is grossly inadequate
for excluding the cross-examination. 5 2 The ignorance of the witnesses is
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note; supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 479-80; supraPart H.B-C.
Seesupra Part V.
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88.
See FED. R. EviD. 404 advisory committee's note.

151.

Id.404(a)(2)(A).

152.

See supraPart IV.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/2

22

Crump: An Edifice of Misshapen Stones: Interpreting Federal Rule of Evid

AN EDIFICEOFMISSHAPEN STONES

2015]

exactly the point, and whether it results from the witnesses's lack of
awareness, lack of temporal acquaintance with the defendant, ignorance
of nonpublic events, or simply ostrich-like blindness, is beside the point.
Character evidence is weak evidence, and it has been offered only
because the defendant has opted to do so in the first place. The jury
should not be deprived of information pointing out that it is misleading,
when it is. Decisions holding that the Government has "substantial
latitude"'1 53 seem more nearly correct, and the cross-examination should
not be excluded unless a Rule 403 balancing analysis shows that the
witnesses is greatly
probative value of impeaching the 1character
54
exceeded by an unfair kind of prejudice.
Rebuttal character evidence, or "bad" character evidence, raises
fewer questions. The Rule that permits the prosecutor to respond to
good-character witnesses by calling other witnesses of different opinions
is straightforwardly written, and makes intuitive sense.1 55 But, issues
sometimes arise when character evidence comes before the jury in
camouflaged form. 56 A skillful defense lawyer may ask an alibi witness
or a self-defense witness, or a witness to a substantive defense a
character question, too, but may disguise it so as to be able to argue that
the prosecutor should not be able to respond. This kind of evidence
presents a heavily contextual, fact-bound issue for the judge to resolve.
If the evidence is truly relevant to the substantive defense-if it tends to
show that an alibi is probable, or that the defendant's conduct really was
an exercise of self-defense-then it should not trigger "have you heard"
questions or rebuttal bad-character testimony.1 57 But, if the evidence is
only tangentially related to the substantive defense, and if it tends more
to claim that the defendant is a good person who would not have
committed this offense, then it is merely character evidence
in camouflage and should enable the Government to let the jury know of
its limitations. 58
In other words, like every issue that arises in this confusing area,
questions about rebuttal witnesses should not be viewed in isolation.
They should be addressed in a way that recognizes the interconnections

153. See supra text accompanying notes 122-35.
154.
155.

FED. R. EVID. 403.
Id. 404(a)(2)(A).

156. See supratext accompanying notes 139-41.
157. See supraPart V.
158. See supra Part V.
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of the individually misshapen stones that are carefully fitted together to
make the edifice, or structure, of character evidence under the Rules.
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